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THE ONCE AND FUTURE PROPERTY TAX:
A DIALOGUE WITH MY YOUNGER SELF
Edward A. Zelinsky*
INTRODUCTION

I am not quite sure when I finally evolved from a brash young
law professor into an irascible middle aged law professor, but I do
not doubt that the evolution is now complete. As I look back on
my youth (expansively defined as the first forty years of my life), I
now realize that, when younger, I was blessed in many ways, some
obvious, some less so. One of the less evident bounties of my
youth was that, in my twenties, I was granted the perfect enemy:
the local real property tax.
My life in New Haven in the mid-1970s revolved around tour
places; the law school, the graduate school of econonucs. New
Haven City Hall, and my home. At all four locations, the
municipal property tax was a dragon to be slain. In the legal
world, the 1970s witnessed a burgeoning determination to displace
the local property tax as the prime funding source for public
education and to supplant local property tax revenue with
expanded state financing, bankrolled by income and/or sales tax
proceeds. At the economics department, the property tax fared as
poorly—a regressive, inadministrable and inelastic levy, a relic of a
bygone era doomed to extinction. I was then an alderman of the
City of New Haven and, when I went to City Hall to work on
budgetary matters, it was clear to all that municipal property taxes
could no longer serve as an important revenue source for urban
centers like New Haven. Indeed, New Haven—an older,
"inelastic"' city then experiencing what we came to call
* Edward A. Zelinsky is professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
of Yeshiva University. For helpful suggestions, he thanks Professors Robert Ellickson md
Evelyn Brody as well as Doris Zelinsky, whose professional focus has shifted from public
finance but who remains em acute critic of her husband's foibles.
A modified version of the Section II of this article appeared in an Urban Institute
book edited by Professor Brody, see THE PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES;
MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 369 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
,
C T-,
• The concept of municipal inelasticity was developed by David Rusk. See DAVID
RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993).
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"deindustrialization,"—seemed to be a perfect example of the
flaws of the local real property tax: its tax base stagnant; its prime
locations occupied by tax-exempt institutions; surrounded by
suburbs, some of which were (and still are) among the nation's
most affluent communities.
Even when I went home, the evils of the property tax were
paramount: My wife, then a staff economist for Connecticut's
association of mayors, was in the front lines fighting for property
tax reform. On more than one occasion, pillow talk was about
different formulas for allocating state assistance to central cities.
In short, everywhere I went, the local real property tax was
perceived as both bad and doomed.
If I could speak with that brash young law student/graduate
student/alderman, he would undoubtedly tell me, with great
confidence, that by the beginning of the next century (which then
seemed very far away) the property tax would no longer play a
role in the system of local public finance. True, he would have
opined, some important issues remained for the transition period
to a property taxless world, e.g., payments-in-lieu-of-taxes
(PILOTS) to central cities as long as they remained dependent on
property tax revenues. But for the long run, the intellectual,
political, and legal assault on local property taxation would lead to
the tax's demise.
Alas, he was wrong.
Today, even the most casual observer of local finance
understands that the property tax continues to play a critical role
funding municipal services, particularly public education.^ Among
the cognoscenti of local finance, the continuing centrality of the
property tax is, if anything, even more widely acknowledged.^
This essay explains why the young man I once was, confident
of the imminent demise of the property tax, was wrong. This is
thus a dialogue with my younger self for, as I look back, it is clear
that much of the critique of the local property tax to which I (and
2 Property taxes remain a major political issue throughout the nation. See David M.
Halbfinger, Franks Proposes an Overhaul of New Jersey's Property Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Jtme 22, 2001, at B4; Dirk Johnson & Kevin Peraino, Ventura's Shutdown Smackdown,
NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2001, at 32 (discussing Mirmesota Governor Ventura's program for
increased state educational assistance and lower property taxes).
3 Legal scholars and public finance economists today devote significant attention to
the legal and policy issues posed by the local property tax. See William A. Fischel,
Homevoters, Municipal Corporate Governance, and the Benefit View of the Property Tax,
54 NAT'L TAX J. 157 (2001); John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public
Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 421; George
R. Zodrow, The Property Tax As a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views, 54 NAT'LTAX
J. 139 (2001).
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others) adhered was overstated. As we enter the new century, the
local property tax survives for many reasons; chief among these is
that the tax has distinct theoretical and practical advantages.
This is not to say that the standard local property tax is
perfect or incapable of practical improvement; not everything I
believed in my youth was wrong. But reality is indeed more
complex than I and others thought: We overestimated the
problems of the local property tax and underestimated the tax's
virtues. We did not foresee the extent to which modifications of
the tax and alternative revenue sources for localities would prove
to be, not initial steps toward the abolition of the local property
tax, but, rather, ameliorative reforms which would enable the real
property tax to survive. We similarly underappreciated the need
for robust local government to possess its own tax base and how
well-adapted the local property tax is for financing genuinely local
expenditures. We subscribed to overly-idealized notions of sales
and income tax bases, forcing (in our minds, at least) the realities
of the property tax into an inherently unwinnable competition with
theoretically perfect alternatives for financing public services. The
choices in the real world proved more difficult.
I. THE INDICTMENT AND PARTIAL
ACQUITTAL OF THE PROPERTY TAX

In retrospect, the intellectual critique of the local property tax
to which I and others adhered seems overly-simplistic; at the time,
it seemed compelling. The critique rested on five premises. First,
we confidently believed, the local property tax is invariably
regressive. The economic incidence of the tax, this argument goes,
falls heavily—and unfairly—on homeowners (who pay property
taxes directly) and tenants (who pay such taxes indirectly via
higher rents); since housing costs absorb greater percentages of the
budgets of low- and middle-income families, property taxes
disproportionately impact those budgets; because affluent families
save greater percentages of their incomes and spend
proportionately less of their incomes on housing, such families
devote smaller percentages of their incomes to local property taxes
than do low- and middle-income households.
Second, the critique continued, the property tax imposes its
burden irrespective of the taxpayer's liquidity vel non. The classic
example is the retiree hving on a fixed income whose home
appreciates significantly in value and whose local property tax
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obligation rises commensurately. Since the retiree's income is
static, rising property taxes absorb increasingly large percentages
of that income, creating liquidity problems for the fixed-income
retiree.
Third, from the perspective of the municipal fisc, the real
property tax base is inelastic, increasing less rapidly than other tax
bases, most notably income. Under the classic, progressive income
tax (unindexed for inflation), government revenues grow more
rapidly than income itself since economic growth and inflation
push taxpayers into higher marginal brackets. Even when
progressive income taxes are automatically inflation-adjusted,
government revenues in times of economic growth expand faster
under such taxes than does income itself as increasingly
prosperous taxpayers climb into higher brackets.''
In contrast, under the classic real property tax—^with a single,
fixed rate of tax—^revenues rise less rapidly than income (even
with accurate annual property valuations) since, in a modem
economy, a lower percentage of new economic growth accrues to
real estate and a correspondingly higher percentage of such growth
accmes to services and intangible property, outside the scope of
the real property levy. The inelasticity of the local property tax is
in practice compounded by delays in assessing property values and
by inaccuracies once those assessments are made; applying fixed
tax rates to old and inaccurate assessments yields static revenues.
Fourth, the local property tax, the critique continued, is unfair
because of its local nature. This argument was particularly welldeveloped in the context of litigation challenging the use of local
property taxes to finance public education.' The contention
advanced in that litigation and in much of the relevant scholarly
literature' was that children residing in communities with hmited
* See, e.g., Becky Trout, League Says Municipal Finances Look Good; Reliance on
Property Taxes Throttles Cities, BNA DAILY TAX REP., July 2, 1999, at H-1 (quoting
Donald J. Borut, executive director of the National League of Cities; "Not only is the
property tax much less influenced by economic activity than the income or sales tax, the
very nature of economic activity is also moving away from the traditional linkage of
tangible property to economic production and growth."); Doug Sheppard, City Survey:
The Good, The Bad, and the Semigood, TAX ANALYSTS, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2,
1999, at 127-11 ("Municipal property tax revenues, in fact, increased only 3.9 percent in
1998, compared with increases of 6.5 percent and 6.8 percent in income tax and sales tax
revenues, respectively.").
5 Among the most recent decisions in the decades-long saga of this litigation are
Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government v. Vermont, 730 A.2d 573 (Vt. 1999);
Anderson v. Vermont, 723 A.2d 1147 (Vt. 1998); Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 3M
(1997); and Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997).
^ A good summary of this literature, as well as a perceptive analysis of the voluminous
case law, are to be found in Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I B The Structure of
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property tax bases face poorer educational systems than children
hving in localities with more ample property tax revenue. While
the proponents of school finance reform were generally careful to
eschew explicit claims that such reform would improve the
scholastic performance of disadvantaged students, the implicit
promise of their efforts was clear: substituting more generous state
school financing for inadequate local funds would improve
educational results.
Moreover, the critique of the local nature of the local
property tax readily generalizes to municipal services other than
education: Residents of communities with less property tax
resources can less easily finance adequate public services than can
residents of localities with abundant property tax bases.
Finally, the ad valorem nature of the real property tax,
whatever its theoretical appeal, is in practice hard to implement.
Absent actual sales, it is difficult and resource-consuming to
appraise much valuable real estate, e.g., unique homes, special
purpose industrial and commercial structures. Moreover, the
appraisal process has historically been subject to considerable
political manipulation, not the least because of the difficulties of
determining fair market values absent sale transactions.
As compelhng as these arguments may have seemed to me
and others in the 1970s, a generation later, much (though not all)
of this critique requires significant qualification while other parts
of this critique look just plain wrong.
Chief among the intellectual developments challenging this
critique of the local property tax are two alternative claims now
widely accepted by students of property taxation: that the property
tax is, as an economic matter, a tax on capital income generally
and that the property tax essentially purchases benefits received
from municipal government.' In the first case, the tax is
progressive in its economic incidence; in the second case, the tax
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,23-24 (1990).
^ See Fischel, supra note 3; Therese J. McGuire, Federal Aid to States and Localities
and the Appropriate Competitive Framework, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 153,158 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) ("[Tjhe
primary source of local raised revenue is property taxes, a tax often thought of as a benefit
tax."); Thomas J. Nechyba, The Benefit View and the New View, in PROPERTY TAXATION
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (2001); Wallace E. Gates & Robert M. Schwab, The
Allocative and Distributive Implications of Local Fiscal Competition, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 127 ("if many local governments
compete against one another, then all local taxes become benefit taxes"); Zodrow, supra
note 3; George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the New View and the Benefit View of the
Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RNANCE (Wallace
E. Gates ed., 2001).
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has no net economic effect since the cost of the tax is offset by the
benefits the tax purchases. While both views cannot be correct,
together they erode the once widely-held belief that property
taxation passes onto the consumers of housing and is thus
regressive in its ultimate economic effect.
Central to the characterization of the real property tax as a
levy on capital income generally is Professor Harberger's model of
the corporate income tax and his conclusion that the corporate tax
ultimately falls on all capital, corporate and noncorporate.® For
purposes of this discussion. Professor Harberger's basic insights
are that the corporate levy is initially imposed on selective capital
(i.e., capital invested in corporate solution), that capital for the
long term is fungible and mobile between the corporate and
noncorporate portions of the economy, and that the owners of
corporate capital, to avoid selective taxation, will seek higher
after-tax returns by shifting their investments from the (taxed)
corporate sector to the (nontaxed) unincorporated sector. This
shift of capital, in turn, contracts the corporate sector and expands
the amount of capital invested noncorporately. The upshot is a
lower rate of return for all owners of capital as the holders of
corporate capital are taxed while the owners of noncorporate
capital receive lower returns since the supply of noncorporate
capital is increased by the tax-induced movement of resources into
the unincorporated sector to avoid corporate taxation; the
consequent increase of the supply of noncorporate capital
depresses the rate of return to such capital.
The Harberger model is readily adaptable to the local
property tax, which, like the corporate income tax, is a selective
tax on one particular sector of capital investment, i.e., real
property.' To avoid this selective taxation, mobile capital will
migrate to nontaxed sectors, i.e., forms of investment other than
real property. Thus, the property tax turns out to be an impost on
capital, imposed (directly) on capital held as real property and
(indirectly) on all other capital, the supply of which is increased by
the migration of capital avoiding real property'" taxation with an
attendant decrease in the rate of return to non-real estate capital.
If the real property levy is conceived in this fashion as
8 See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 294-98 (4th ed. 1995).
^ Id. at 530-31.
While remnants of the property tax on intangible and personal property persist in
some places, in essence, the local property tax is today a tax on real estate. See JEROME
R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LXICAL TAXATION 97 (7th ed.
2001) (discussing the "long-term process of gradually excluding most personalty and
intangibles" from property taxation).
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ultimately burdening capital in general, the distributional
implications of the tax are more complex than the traditional
critique suggests. To the extent the property tax is passed onto
renters and less affluent homeowners, that critique retains force
since lower- and middle-income families devote higher
percentages of their budgets to housing costs than do affluent
households and thus spend (via their rent and mortgage payments)
higher percentages of their incomes on real property taxation than
do more prosperous families.
However, to the extent that the property tax falls on the
owners of capital generally, the tax is potentially progressive in its
impact; indeed, the property tax resembles the kind of wealth
impost favored by certain commentators." The characterization of
the property tax as a potentially progressive levy on wealth is
reinforced by the fact that the real property tax, conceived as a tax
on the users of particular types of capital, falls directly, not just on
homeowners, but on the holders of commercial and industrial real
estate as well.
The alternative challenge to the traditional wisdom, premised
on the seminal writings of Charles Tiebout, views the property tax
as a wash: the payment of property taxes purchases offsetting
benefits in the form of government services.'^ In a Tieboutian
world, if a particular taxpayer does not desire the package of taxes
and services offered by the community in which he resides, he will
change his residence to a locality furnishing a set of taxes and
services more to his liking. Thus, each individual's property tax
payments ultimately purchase for him a bundle of local
government services which, in the individual's judgment, are worth
the property tax cost.
Of course, this model is not without its limitations and
qualifications. In any given metropolitan area, there may not in
practice be enough municipalities to offer every individual the
particular package of taxes and services he considers optimal;
relocation from locality to locality may not be as easy as the
Tiebout model assumes.
Nevertheless, with all of the necessary limitations and
" See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Your Stake in America, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 249 (19W); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth
Transfer Taxation- A Response to Professor McCaffrey, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996).
'2 Tiebout's 1956 article is one of the few academic articles which truly deserves to be
called seminal. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of current legal and economic
scholarship on public finance without Tiebout's analysis. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 157;
Zodrow, supra note 3, at 140 ("the renowned Tiebout model of local government").
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qualifications, the benefits perspective on the local property tax
contains an important insight: local property taxes can plausibly be
characterized as, in large measure, the price paid for a particular
bundle of government services. To that extent, the tax expended is
offset by the municipal benefits received.
A further intellectual trend impugning the critique of the real
property tax has been renewed interest in the problem of imputed
income. Historically, the failure of income taxation to reach
imputed income has been dismissed as a self-evident concession to
administrative and political considerations. While, as a theoretical
matter, homeowners receive imputed income from the rental
values of their houses, the possibility of taxing this imputed income
had traditionally been dismissed by invoking the practical
difficulties of determining the amount of such income and by
noting the unlikelihood that a representative who voted for taxing
imputed income would be present for the next session of Congress
to help implement his decision.
However, the problem of imputed income becomes more
complicated once one considers the economic effects of excluding
such income from the income tax base and the possibility that
indirect taxation might, practically and in politically feasible ways,
implicitly reach such imputed income. As a matter of economic
efficiency, the allocation of resources is distorted when cash
income is taxed but imputed income is not, since taxpayers are
induced to hold resources in forms which produce (untaxed)
imputed income rather than (taxed) cash income.
Much
contemporary tax policy literature describes and decries these
kinds of tax-based economic distortions."
Indeed, one of the staples today of an introductory law school
course on the federal income tax is to contrast the tax burden of a
renter who puts his money in the bank, pays tax on the resulting
interest, and uses the after-tax cash to pay (nondeductible) rent
with the lighter income tax burden of a homeowner who invests his
cash in a house and lives in it, free of imputed rental income."
This simple comparison is particularly enlightening for my
students who pay New York City rents.
However, the real property tax may be characterized as an
indirect way of reaching the imputed rental value of homes. From
" See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE,
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 80 (2d ed. 1999) ("[EJconomists would argue that imputed
income from consumer assets should be taxed on neutrality grounds: Excluding such
imputed income creates excessive demand for consumer assets as opposed to savings and
investments.").
See id. at 79-80.
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this perspective, our hypothetical fixed-income retiree has more
income than he realizes since, in addition to his cash income, he
receives imputed income from his residence; in simplest terms, his
home eliminates the need for the retiree to pay rent. The local
property tax is a way of reaching this imputed income, correcting
in rough fashion for the failure of the income tax to reach that
income. If the resulting tax burden stresses the retiree's cash flow,
that may be an economically appropriate signal that the retiree is
overconsuming housing by staying in his home.
To be sure, it is not a politically compelling defense of the
local property tax that it reaches the imputed rental value of
homes missed by income taxation and that homeowners' liquidity
complaints may indicate that they are overhoused. This analysis
does, however, challenge the critique of the tax to which I and
others adhered.
Also undermining that critique has been the academic
doctrine known as optimal tax theory. For our purposes, the most
important insights of that theory are that taxes (and, by extension,
the benefits of government services) are capitalized into the value
of taxed assets and that a simple static snapshot of current tax
payments belies the underlying economics of taxation.
To return to our hypothetical retiree, the stream of
anticipated property tax payments affected the price of his home
when he originally bought that home. If, for example, the
community in which the home is located has an unusually heavy
tax burden, the retiree paid correspondingly less for his home than
he would have had the home been located in a lower-taxed
locality. Similarly, if the community has a particularly good school
system, the value of the retiree's house is currently greater than it
otherwise would be; his property tax payments can thus be
characterized as maintaining the value of his home via the quahty
of school services.
Indeed, if the retiree sent his children to the local pubhc
schools, he was, for those years, effectively subsidized by the
community's childless families and by commercial and residential
property owners, since, in the short run, a homeowner's own
property tax payments rarely cover all the costs of educating his
children.'^ From this vantage, the retiree's current property taxes
constitute delayed payment for the educational services he
received earlier.
Moreover, the elasticity of a tax base does not appear to be
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cities and the Middle Class: Another Look at the Urban
Crisis, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1081.
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the unalloyed virtue today that it once did. As a substantive
matter, government expenditures provoke greater skepticism
today than they did a generation ago. Procedurally, even those
more sanguine about government outlays have grown more
sensitive to the problems of a public sector on autopilot. There is,
for example, widespread recognition that entitlement-type
expenditures can distort public priorities.
Public sector
accountabUity can be enhanced by a tax (like the inelastic property
levy) which continuously requires elected officials to decide openly
about the size of public outlays by voting on tax rates.
In a sluggish economy, the relative inelasticity of property tax
revenues may appear as something of a virtue as, on the downside,
receipts from the more cyclical income and sales levies decline
while the property tax base remains comparatively stable.'®
In addition, mounting evidence suggests that increased
funding for public schools has not improved student
performance." There remain arguments for substantial state
financing of public schools: In a world of residential mobihty
among locahties, municipalities tend to underfund education since
students are unlikely to remain in the community as taxpayers and
workers, repaying the community for its investment in their
educations; notions of citizenship imply a basic commitment to
each child regardless of his or her family's economic circumstances
or locality; pubhc education has an important redistributive
component; for practical and theoretical reasons, redistributive
activity should occur at higher levels of government. From these
perspectives, state educational funding counteracts communities'
tendency to underfinance education and guarantees each child his
or her basic rights to schooling. While I find these arguments
persuasive, I confess that they lack the emotional punch and
intellectual clarity of earlier promises that jettisoning property taxSee Wallace E. Oates, The Theory and Rationale of Local Property Taxation, in
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE FOR THE 1990S: A CASE STUDY OF ARIZONA 420 (Therese
J. McGuire & Dana Wolfe Naimark eds., 1991) ("[PJroperty taxation promises a more
stable source of local revenues than does a local income tax."); John E. Petersen, Bet on
the Tortoise, GOVERNING, Apr. 2001, at 72 ("The sustained but gentle growth in property
values has made the property tax the tortoise in the revenues race.").
See Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in
Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1141, 1162 (1986) ("There appears to be no
strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures tmd student
performance."); Gary Burtless, Introduction to DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF
SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 41 (Gary
Burtless ed., 1996) ("Statistical evidence tmd recent historical experience suggest to me
that school performance is unlikely to be improved solely by investing extra money in the
nation's schools.").
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financed public education would improve educational
performance.
Finally, the unstated premise of the critique embraced by my
younger self was that competing tax bases—the income and sales
taxes—^were obviously preferable to the real property levy as
means of financing public services. To contemporary eyes, this is
perhaps the most naive part of the critique, an overidealized
notion of the alternatives to property taxation. Much of the
output of the tax policy community over the last generation has
documented the theoretical and practical limitations of the income
tax.'® Important voices similarly suggest that the viability of the
sales tax is threatened both by the reluctance of legislatures to
extend sales taxation to general services" and by the
administrative problem of collecting the sales tax in a world of
mail order and electronic commerce.
What, then, is left of the intellectual critique of the property
tax which was so central to my younger years? Parts of that
critique retain force: Concerns about regressivity remain insofar as
the tax is passed onto tenants or is absorbed by homeowners of
modest means; concerns about the appraisal process are still wellfounded;^" despite the disappointing gap between increased
funding and improved student performance, persuasive reasons
exist for allocating to the states a strong role in financing public
education.
In short, the property tax, like any other human institution, if
compared to a pristine theoretical ideal, will understandably prove
wanting. However, in a world of imperfect choices, the local
property tax, with its problems and limitations, is not as bad as the
critique of my youth suggested and remains a viable revenue
source for municipal government.
II.

REFORM AS PRESERVATION

While academics and policy analysts were undermining the
Much of that critique has been developed under the rubric of tax expenditure
analysis. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
" HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, at 746-49.
20 While there are those who contend that modem, computerized appraisal methods
remedy the deficiencies of the appraisal proeess, I am skeptical of such claims. See
Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 881-82 (1997). However, as I
discuss infra, the loeal property tax has distinct administrative advantages over alternative
tax bases because of the visibility of real estate and its fixed situs.
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critique of the property tax to which I and others ascribed,
legislators and voters were simultaneously responding to
taxpayers' loudest complaints about the local property levy. The
result has been a nationwide expansion of devices which answer
some of the most politically urgent outcries about the tax. These
devices fall into three categories:^^ (a) provisions which abate the
local property taxes of particular kinds of taxpayers (e.g.,
homeowners, the elderly, farmers), (b) general limitations which
cap the taxes local governments can impose, and (c) increased
financial assistance to municipal treasuries to offset the need for
local property tax revenues.
Among the best known of the devices in the first category is
the classic homestead exemption, which immunizes from taxation
a portion of the value of each taxpayer's principal residence, e.g.,
the first $10,000 of the taxpayer's primary home.^^ Since
commercial and industrial real estate, as well as second homes, do
not receive equivalent exemption, the burden of the tax shifts
toward such nonexempted property.^^
Equally well known are devices, variously denoted as
homestead provisions,^" "circuitbreakers,"^^ or income tax credits,^®
21 In theory, there is a fourth category of devices that have abated the pinch of the real
property tax, i.e., market-based arrangements such as so-called "reverse mortgages,"
which permit older persons to borrow incrementally against the unrealized appreciation of
their homes. However, in practice, such market-based devices have not played a
significant role in alleviating discontent with the property tax.
22 See W. VA. CONST, art. X, sec. lb, subsec. C (authorizing the legislature to adopt an
exemption up to $20,000 for real property "used exclusively for residential purposes" by
nonelderly, nondisabled homeowners); FCA. STAT. ANN. § 196.031(1) (West 1999)
(granting "[e]very person" an "exemption from all taxation" of the first $5,000 of "his or
her permanent residence"); TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(a), (b) (Vernon 1992) (providing all
"adult[s]" with a basic "exemption from taxation" for county and school district property
taxes for the adult's "residence homestead").
Tj'pically, states with such general exemptions supplement them with additional or
more generous exemptions for elderly, disabled and/or low income homeowners. See
TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(c) (providing additional exemption from school district taxation
for residences of the disabled and those aged 65 and older); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.031(3)
(increasing homestead exemptions for homeowners aged 65 and older and for "disabled
person[s]"); W.VA. CONST, art. X, sec. lb, subsec. C (requiring homestead exemption for
taxpayers who are 65 or older or who are disabled).
22 Alan Gireenblatt, The Loathsome Local Levy, GOVERNING, Oct. 2001, at 36-37
("the simple fact is that many states have put all kinds of brakes in place to assure that
property-tax bills do not rise as fast as property values. Much residential property-tax
relief shifts a good deal of the burden from homeowners to commercial and industrial
property.").
2^ See 35 111. COMP. STAT. ANN. 200/15-170 (West 1996) (establishing a "Senior
Citizens Homestead Exemption"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.810(2)(a) (Michie 2001)
(providing a homestead exemption for persons 65 and older and for disabled
homeowners); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-250 (Law Co-op. 2000) (homestead exemption for
taxpayers aged sixty-five and older, "totally and permanently disabled" or "legally blind").
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which provide relief for an individual's property tax obligation on
the basis of the individual's age (typically, sixty-five or older),
income level,^' or disability. Despite the arguments which belie the
image of the fixed income retiree squeezed by property taxes—^the
putative fixed income retiree has substantial imputed income from
his home; the community may well have educated his children at
considerable cost; given the inflation-adjusted nature of Social
Security and many private pensions, the retiree's income is not so
fixed—^the image of the illiquid, elderly property taxpayer packs
significant political wallop. Legislatures have, unsurprisingly,
responded.
Particularly noteworthy has been the increasing use of state
income tax systems to bestow property tax relief. Such use allows
legislators and governors to make clear to the public that they
(rather than municipal officeholders) are abating the property tax
burden, since, on an annual basis, the credit is reflected on the
taxpayer's state income tax return (rather than his local property
tax bill). One need not accept the premises of public choice theory
in their starkest form^^ to see the resulting political advantage to
state officials, in contrast to alternative forms of reducing property
tax obligations (e.g., state assistance to municipal treasuries) which
charmel relief through the municipality and thus fail to alert the
taxpayer that that relief ultimately emanates from the state house,
not city hall.
As an administrative matter, such credits have much to
commend them. The annual return for state income taxes is a
particularly efficient means of channeling income-based property
25 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.6(a)(2), (3) (2001) (labeling income tax credits for
property taxes psiid as "circuit breaker[s]"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2802(9) (West
2001) (designating as a "circuit breaker" Oklahoma's property tax relief provisions for low
income elderly and disabled homeowners).
26 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.520(1) (West 1998) (credits against state income
taxes for "property taxes on the taxpayer's homestead"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-33-5 (1999)
(establishing an income tax credit for "property taxes accrued").
22 Maryland limits its credit for property taxes by wealth as well as income. See MD.
CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 9-104(i)(l) (2001) ("A property tax credit under this section
may not be granted to a homeowner whose combined net worth exceeds $200,000
").
28 For purposes of this analysis, the critical public choice premise is that officeholders
advance their political interests by dispensing governmental largesse so as to maximize
electoral support. In this context, a governor or legislator who allocates state funds to
reduce local property taxes will want taxpayers to know that he is responsible for their
reduced property tax obligations. On public choice more generally, see Edward A.
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171-72 (1993); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369-1370 (1993)
[hereinafter Unfunded Mandates].
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tax relief since that return must be filed anyway thus constitutes a
preexisting device for communicating at low marginal cost the
availability of property tax relief.^' When the taxpayer files his
state income tax return, he is, as part of that process, reminded to
take the credit for property taxes. Moreover, a taxpayer who
discloses income on that return automatically reveals his income
level for the purpose of the property tax credit, allowing the credit
to be calibrated to that income level.
My younger self viewed the profusion of circuitbreakers,
homestead exemptions, and income tax credits for property taxes
paid as important steps in the demise of the property tax. My
older self sees them as undergirding a different political dynamic:
By responding to some of the most politically compeUing
complaints about the property tax, such mechanisms "fix" the tax,
inoculating it from more radical surgery.
One could imagine scenarios where progressively higher
homestead levels or more generous circuitbreakers so decimate
the property tax base that that base effectively ceases to exist. So
far, however, the dynamic has been ameliorative: By alleviating
the burdens of homeowners, these devices have tended to preserve
the tax from more radical assault, allowing the property tax to play
a reduced, but still important, role in financing local government.
Yet another approach has been the classification of different
types of properties for the purpose of taxing the various categories
at different rates. At one level, homestead exemptions, tax credits
and circuitbreakers, available only to homeowners, implicitly serve
as classification devices, since they target relief to one kind of real
estate, i.e., principal residences. However, classification schemes
in their prototypical form explicitly divide all taxed properties into
a variety of different categories, each with its own effective tax
rate.^° Not surprisingly, the politically-sensitive categories—
owner-occupied homes, the homes of the disabled, farm land—
tend to receive the most lenient treatment under such classification
schemes.
Classification schemes raise important issues of
administrability. As the number of categories multiplies, the
problems of pigeonholing particular properties become more
pronounced. Moreover, under such arrangements, political
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973,1010 (1986).
30 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13 (West 1999); see also John H. Bowman, Real
Property Classification, in STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE FOR THE 1990S: A CASE STUDY
OF ARIZONA 426-429, supra note 16.
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pressure mounts, both to create more categories and to manipulate
the categorization of specific properties.^' At a more theoretical
level, broad classification schemes (even more so than narrowlyfocused circuitbreakers, homestead exemptions, and property tax
credits) violate the basic premise of ad valorem property taxation,
i.e., that tax burdens should be allocated in accordance with fair
market value. Under the prototypical classification scheme,^^ two
adjacent properties, with identical fair market values, may have
significantly different tax obligations because they fall into
different classifications.^^
Even in states without general classification schemes, one
form of property is often singled out generically for more lenient
taxation: farm land, frequently taxed on less than its fair market
value.^ The defense of such favorable treatment typically invokes
the image of a family farm on the cusp of suburban development.
If that farm is appraised and taxed at fair market value, i.e., as land
subdivided for housing, the family will be forced to sell the farm to
pay its property taxes. By taxing the farm more lightly, the
argument goes, the family can continue its agricultural lifestyle.
Special tax treatment for farm land appeals to the most basic
See, e.g., Maud Naroll, Nevada Lawmakers Approve Third Property Tax Category,
STATE TAX TODAY, July 5,2001, at 129-17 ("Nevada lawmakers have passed a resolution
to put another property tax category in the state constitution.").
California's Proposition 13 can be understood, in part, as a classification scheme
which categorizes property by the year in which it was acquired by the taxpayer. As has
been widely noted, this frequently results in substantially identical properties being taxed
at radically different levels because the earlier acquired property is essentially assessed at
its historical acquisition cost while the more recently purchased property is assessed more
closely to its fair market value. See, e.g., Terri A. Sexton et al.. Proposition 13: Unintended
Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99 (1999).
Municipalities frequently engage in a form of classification by abating, permanently
or temporarily, the property tax liabilities of newly-constructed projects. See, e.g., Joan M.
Youngman, Property, Taxes, and the Future of Property Taxes, in TUE FXJTURE OF STATE
TAXATION 123 (David Brunori ed., 1998) (discussing "widespread use of tax incentives for
business location and expansion.").
Such abatements are designed to attract economic development which allegedly
would otherwise not occur within the locality. While these kinds of developmentattracting property tax abatements raise important issues, they are not central to my
analysis here, which focuses upon property tax devices aimed at mollifying popular
objection to such taxation. Indeed, economic development abatements are often
politically contentious as homeowners and small business people resent the perception
that they are paying higher taxes than large (often, out-of-town) developers and
corporations.
3^ See ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.060(a) (Michie 2000) (providing that, for municipal
property taxes, farm land "shall be assessed on the basis of full and true value for farm use
and may not be assessed as if subdivided or used for some other nonfarm purpose"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 308.370(1) (1992) (providing that farm land shall "be valued at its value for
farm use and not at the real market value it would have if applied to other than farm
use").
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cultural iconography of American life, as well as to eontemporary
concerns about suburban sprawl and open land. For present
purposes, however, classifying farm land for more favorable
property tax treatment reconciles a distinct, well-organized
group—^farmers—^to the continuance of real property taxation.
In contrast to devices whieh abate the taxes of particular
taxpayers and properties, a second type of provision imposes
general limitations on localities' ability to tax. The best known of
these limitations is California's Proposition 13 which, inter alia,
generally precludes municipalities from taxing more than one
percent of a property's assessed value. Proposition 13 spawned a
host of similar property tax hmitations throughout the country.^^
Even in those states where such limitations were not adopted.
Proposition 13 created a chmate which increased the (already
great) sensitivity of munieipal officials to the political perils of
raising property tax rates.
My younger self viewed Proposition 13 as validating the belief
that the property tax was doomed to extinction. In retrospect, the
reality has, again, been more complex: Proposition 13 and its
progeny, by capping locally-derived property tax revenues, have
generally afforded sufficient relief from property taxation to
preempt further efforts to abolish such taxation.
A third practical reason that local property taxation has
survived, despite the expectations of my youth, has been the
growth of alternative revenues for municipal treasuries, revenues
which have mitigated the need to raise funds from the property tax
and have correspondingly reduced the rehance of localities on
property tax dollars. In part, the growth of alternative revenues
has taken the form of increased state aid to localities, filling the
financial gaps left by Proposition 13 and its progeny. In part, this
growth has taken the form of state assistance for public school
systems in response to state judicial determinations that
educational funding overly-reliant on local property tax revenues
is constitutionally defective.^® Municipally-imposed user fees
constitute yet another expanding source of nonproperty tax
revenues for localities in the wake of property tax hmitations.^'
A particularly notable source of nonproperty tax revenue for
35 See Steven M. Sheffrin, The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy
Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION, supra note 33, at 134; Alvin D.
Sokolow, The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations, 28 PUBLIUS 165, 171
(1998) ("[T]he property-tax limitations enacted after 1970 restrict local government
finances much more severely than the measures adopted earlier.").
3® See Sokolow, supra note 35, at 171.
33 See Sheffrin, supra note 35, at 135.
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localities has been expanded payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOT).
PILOT payments come in a variety of configurations. In one
version of PILOT, a higher level of government that owns
property reimburses from its general revenues the lower level
jurisdictions in which such property is located for some or all of
the taxes such property would yield if taxable. Thus, for example,
the federal government in a variety of instances reimburses states
and locaUties for taxes such jurisdictions would otherwise receive
from federally-owned land.^® Many states^" similarly compensate
municipahties for state-owned (i.e., tax-exempt) properties within
the borders of such municipalities. In yet other versions of PILOT
payments, states reimburse localities for properties owned by
governmental instrumentalities.'^ In still other variations of
PILOT programs, such instrumentalities (e.g., publicly-owed
utilities, housing authorities, airport commissions) are directed or
authorized to make payments from their own operating revenues
to localities in lieu of taxes."*' At least two states (Connecticut and
Rhode Island) make PILOT payments from general revenues to
reimburse municipalities for the presence of certain private,
nonprofit institutions within the municipalities' boundaries."^
In another version of PILOT payments, such payments come
to the locality by agreement between the locality and a private taxexempt entity, which sends a check to the municipal fisc while the
entity retains its exempt status. While these PILOT payments are
nominally voluntary outlays by the exempt institution, the political
^ See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (1994) ("The Secretary of the Interior shall make a
payment for each fiscal year to each unit of general local government in which entitlement
iand is located
").
See COLO. CONST, art. XXVII, § 10 (State land acquired pursuant to Great
Outdoors Colorado Program "shall be subject to payments in lieu of taxes to counties in
which said acquisitions are made."); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4654 (West 2001) ("There
shall be paid to each county in which lands acquired for state forest purposes are
situated... an amount equivalent to taxes levied by the county on similar land similarly
situated in the county
"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 17 (2001) (payments in
lieu of taxes to towns in which certain state-owned institutions are located).
"0 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 463A.4 (West 1997) ("The state shall make payments in lieu
of taxes to compensate for the loss of tax revenues occasioned by the fact that property is
owned by the upper Mississippi riverway commission, and thereby exempt from taxation
by subdivisions of this state.").
See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-3-2-10 (Michie 2000) (providing for PILOT payments
from "public entities" such as airport authorities and wastewater treatment facilities); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 58.580 (Michie 1997) (Churchill Downs Authority required to make
PILOT payments in "an amount equal to the local property taxes Churchill Downs would
have paid under private ownership"); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 6-411 (2001)
(Administration of the Port of Baltimore required to make PILOT payments "to the
Mayor and City Coimcil of Baltimore" for certain properties).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-20a (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 45-13-5.1 (1999).
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reality is usually more complex as the municipality brandishes any
number of potential sanctions to induce the PILOT payment.'*^
These sanctions range from the municipality marshaling public
opinion against the exempt entity if it declines to make PILOT
pajmients to the denial of zoning relief or building permits desired
by the tax-exempt entity to, in the extreme case, the municipality's
threat to seek political or judicial revocation of the entity's taxexempt status.
In practice, it is typically in everyone's interest to compromise
on a "voluntary" PILOT payment which is often less than the full
taxes that would be paid on loss of exempt status, but which, from
the municipality's perspective, provides immediate financial
succor.'*''
In short, just as the theoretical critique of the local property
tax to which my younger self adhered was undermined
intellectually, in practical terms a variety of measures alleviated
many of the most burdensome features of the tax. By responding
to the most pressing political imperatives, these measures have
immunized the tax from outright abolition.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE VIRTUES OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX

My younger self would have found it oxymoronic to speak of
the virtues of the local property tax. To my older, if not wiser, self,
it seems clear that the persistence of the local property levy is
attributable to more than inertia: The real property tax is, in many
respects, well-adapted to the imperatives of local government.
Robust local government*^ requires its own revenue base.
Municipalities totally dependent for funding on the state and
See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Harvard Deal With Boston Hints at Era Of Harmony,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,1999, at All ("Not that the city would say, exactly, that it has been
blocking Harvard since the land-buying ruckus began, ... but Boston wants to complete
the deal on the [PILOT] payments, and it is 'first things first from the city's perspective.'");
see also Youngman, supra note 33, at 120 ("At the local level, cities have exerted increased
pressure on exempt institutions to initiate or increase payments in lieu of taxes.").
See, e.g.. Rick Valliere, Medical Center to Retain Tax Exemption, Make Annual
Payments to City of Lebanon, BNA DAILY TAX REP., 09 DTR H-1 (Jan. 14, 2002); J.
Cfuistine Harris & Fred Stokeld, City to Grant Property Tax Exemption in Exchange for
Payments in Lieu of Taxes, 2002 TAX NEWS TODAY, Jan. 14,2002, at 9-3.
There is, to be sure, an important premise here: the desirability of robust local
government. For more on this, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism,
and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998) (reviewing David Rusk, CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS (1993); NEAL R. PEIRCE, QTISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER
IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); DAVID L. KIRP ET AL.. OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING
AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)).
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federal governments cannot exercise a high degree of
independence. Municipalities sharing a revenue base with the
state and federal governments are similarly vulnerable to the
decisions of the higher levels of government which ultimately
exercise first dibs on that base. In Tieboutian terms,a local
government must have its own tax rate to signal the price of public
services provided by that government so that families and firrns
can evaluate the efficiency and desirability of the government's
services.
As the American system of public finance has evolved, real
property taxation has become the independent revenue source of
local government. While histo^ has its claims, were we designing
the American system of public finance ab initio, there are also
reasons—heavily administrative in nature—which would lead us to
assign to the property levy the role of the primary municipal tax
I33.SC

First, real estate is visible, facilitating collection of the real
property tax by localities with little administrative sophistication.
Sales, income and much personal property, tangible and
intangible, can be hidden from the tax collector, thus necessitating
more advanced (often intrusive) forms of tax administration.
Indeed, visibility (or the lack thereof) lies at the core of
contemporary concerns about the long-term viability of sales taxes
and about the growth of abusive tax shelters for publicly-traded
corporations.
In theory, the sales tax is protected by the use tax: If goods are
purchased out-of-state without the payment of sales tax in the
state of purchase, use tax is subsequently due when the as-yet
untaxed goods are brought home. In practice, most such
repatriation of untaxed goods is invisible to the tax collector,
making the use tax impossible to enforce.
Similarly, corporate tax shelter arrangements are difficult for
the IRS to monitor. While these arrangements may involve
hundreds of millions of dollars, the details of these arrangements
are typically buried in complex corporate tax returns involving
bilhons of dollars. Not surprisingly, those concerned about
corporate tax shelters assert the need to induce or require
corporations to disclose such shelters so they can be more readily
evaluated by the IRS."*' There is no comparable problem under the

See Lee A. Sheppard, Slow and Steady Progress on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX
ANALYSTS, TAX NEWS TODAY, July 12, 1999, at 132-4; Sindhu G. Hirani, ABA's Tax
Section Urges Strict Disclosure To Identify Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters, BNA DAILY
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real property tax. Real property is, as lawyers say, open and
notorious, faeilitating the eolleetor's task.
Second, real estate has a fixed and easily determined situs,
which prevents taxpayers from shifting the tax base to another
locality to avoid detection. In contrast, the personal property tax
has largely atrophied in the United States because of the ease with
which taxpayers can move personalty when the collector comes
looking for it.
The situs issue is subtler in the sales and income contexts, but
still highlights the advantages of fixed situs real estate as a local tax
base. Sales may involve multiple parties in different localities, e.g.,
a seller in one municipality, a buyer in another, a shipper in yet a
third. In such cases, identifying in which locality the sale occurs
for tax purposes is difficult, if not downright metaphysical. The
practical problems of collecting the sales tax are similarly serious
in the case of multijurisdietional sales when one locality is entitled
to tax (e.g., the town of the buyer), but the party most easily
charged with a withholding obligation (e.g., the seller) is
elsewhere.
Similar problems arise in the income tax context in the face of
income-generating activity which straddles multiple localities, e.g.,
a corporation with facilities in different cities. Allocating income
to specific localities in such settings is, by definition, arbitrary and
subject to taxpayer manipulation.
Moreover, the situs problems of the sales and income tax
bases are growing greater in an increasingly integrated economy in
which more economic activity overlaps different locahties. It is
widely understood that sales tax is today largely uncollectible on
mail order and internet sales since, under current law, the
jurisdiction of the purchaser is forbidden to impose a withholding
obligation on a seller located outside the jurisdiction. One need
not subscribe to the most expansive forecasts about electronic
commerce''® and telecommuting'" to agree that the problems of
TAX REP., Sept. 10,1999, at G-1.
See, e.g., Trout, supra note 4 (quoting Dontdd J. Borut, executive director of the
National League of Cities: "The rapid growth of electronic commerce is threatening
profound impacts on local businesses as well as local revenue systems if Internet shopping
continues to enjoy a tax shelter that discriminates against local merchants."). Note the
dilemma in Mr. Borut's position. On the one hand, that position decries the property tax
as economically inelastic and therefore less desirable than sales and income taxes. On the
other hand, the predicted expansion of electronic commerce threatens local sales and
income tax revenues and thus bolsters the comparative virtues of the real property levy.
See also AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, IN A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS: THE IMPACT OF TAXES
ON INTERNET COMMERCE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6863,
1998).
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siting sales and income are likely to grow in the years ahead. In a
sense, then, the real property tax, the oldest of taxes, is also the
newest of taxes with a geographically fixed base in a world of
increasingly difficult situs issues.
Finally, real property is universal in the sense that every
locality has some. In contrast, largely residential communities,
lacking significant commercial or retail activity, have little in the
way of sales to tax.
In short, viable local government as Americans know it
requires a tax base which is predominantly the localities' which is
easily allocable by local jurisdiction. The real property tax fits that
prescription.'"
Arrayed against these advantages of local real property
taxation is the great difficulty of determining fair market values for
real estate absent actual sales of such real estate. Here, the
critique of my youth retains its force, because appraising much real
property is time-consuming, fairly subjective and ultimately
manipulable."
While the advocates of computer-based appraisal systems
claim to have solved the appraisal problem, I am skeptical.
Fundamentally, the appraisal process requires such often
problematic determinations as the comparability of properties and
the future income streams predicted for industrial and commercial
facilities. Larger, computerized databases do not eliminate these
judgments and, in some respects, make them more difficult, since
both sides—^the taxpayer and the fisc—can marshal such elaborate
databases on their behalf."
For a different perspective, see Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, The Sky Is Not
Falling: Why State and Local Revenues Were Not Significantly Impacted By The Internet in
1998, STATE TAX TODAY, July 6, 1999, at 128-11 ("Although e-commerce sales are
growing rapidly and are receiving widespread attention, there is only a small current
negative impact on sales and use tax collections
").
See Andrew M. Reidy, Home Work Problems, ABA J., Jan. 2000, at 70
("Telecommuting has gone mainstream. In 1998, more than 11 million employees in the
United States worked at home, connected by computer, e-mail and other electronic
technology, and the number is sure to increase in the coming years."); see also Linda
Micco, Consultant Predicts Fifiy Percent Rise in Contingent Workers Within Next Decade,
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Jan. 5, 2000 ("Within 10 years
home-based
employees (will) constitut(e) another one-quarter to one-third of the workforce.").
5® Professor Fisher summarizes the analysis nicely: "Every parcel of real estate is
visible, in a fixed location, and even the smallest governmental unit (has) taxable property
within its jurisdiction." GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE
PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 120 (1996).
See, e.g.. Ken Dilanian, Many Homes in Philadelphia Region Over- or
Underassessed, STATE TAX TODAY, Dec. 13,2001, at 240-21.
I have been intimately involved in two city-wide property tax appraisals in New
Haven, one as a municipal legislator, the other as a member of the executive branch of the
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The alternative to ad valorem real estate taxation—^to tax
properties at their original acquisition costs—eliminates the
problems of the appraisal process, but at a cost many consider
unacceptably unfair and inefficient, i.e., the discrepant taxation of
economically similar properties based on differences in historical
purchase prices."
In short, the local real property tax is a sound method of
financing local expenditures, with flaws comparable to those of
competing tax bases, i.e., income and sales.
CONCLUSION

While the critique of the property tax I embraced in my youth
was overstated, I am determined, in my middle age, to avoid the
mirror image of that critique, an overly-sanguine estimation of the
current condition of local public finance. I agree, for example,
with those who contend that unfunded mandates distort local
priorities and constitute an unjustifiable form of hidden taxation,
hidden in the sense that those imposing such mandates derive the
political benefits of mandated services, but require local officials to
levy the taxes to pay for them.'" The proper level of financial
assistance to municipalities is a permanently contentious issue,
given the difficulties of identifying and quantifying the
municipality. The former was conducted in traditional fashion with paper files cind
typewritten reports; the latter utilized more advanced computerized methods.
There is no question but that the more advanced technology can be dazzling in its
effect. A homeowner, skeptical that his house has been appraised properly, is instantly
confronted with graphic pictures of his home and comparables, on-screen descriptions of
these properties, and mathematical formulas of value. The data is organized and
presented more efficiently in computerized form than under the old system, relying on
paper files and typewritten reports.
However, as visually impressive as the new technology is, substantively the appraisal
process still involves the Scime (often questionable) judgments as the old system. See
Zelinsky, supra note 20, at 881-82 (1997).
Proposition 13, which essentially shifted California from a traditional ad valorem
system to taxation based on historical acquisition cost, was designed to roll back property
tax burdens, not to solve the problems of the appraisal process. However, a by-product of
that shift is to reduce such problems while imposing often radically different property tax
burdens on homes of equal market value. See, e.g., Terri A. Sexton et. al.. Proposition 13:
Unintended Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99,101 (1999) (In L^s Angeles
county, "[t]he typical home buyer paid $280,000 for a house in 1991 and paid $2,800 in
property taxes. In contrast, a homeowner who had owned an identical dwelling since 1975
paid only $540 in property taxes.").
^ See Unfunded Mandates, supra note 28; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem
of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741 (1997). For a contrary perspective,
see Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 Nw.
U. L. REV. 351 (1999).
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externalities of local public services and thus determining the level
of those services which should be paid for by state or federal
taxpayers benefitting from such externalities. It is similarly
difficult to agree upon the implicitly redistributional component of
many municipal activities, most obviously, education, but others—
such as police services—as well. Absent such agreement, it is
impossible to definitively resolve how much of such activities
should be financed by the higher levels of government at which
redistribution should take place.
In short, it is not easy to determine what is a genuinely local
expenditure, properly financed by local property taxes.
My younger self would have rejected the legitimacy of that
inquiry: Even after the federal and state governments make proper
payments to localities for mandated services, services generating
inteijuridictional benefits and services of an implicitly
redistributive nature, my younger self would have insisted that the
remaining cost of bona fide local activity is better financed by
means of local income and sales taxation. My older self sees the
benefits of financing that genuinely local activity with local
property taxes.

